THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY DAVID COPP PDF

flexible enough to accommodate new instances of the category to which they ap-ply? (ii) What degree of internal structure and differentiation (or ‘‘partitioning’’;see Nelson 1985) do schemas possess, and how do they fit into larger structures ofknowledge and memory? Question (i) w[r]

mantic rules. The uniform representation is referred to as the syntax-lexiconcontinuum (cf. Langacker 1987: 25–27, 35–36), illustrated in table 18.1.Syntactic rules (and the accompanying rules of semantic interpretation) areschematic, complex constructions. Idioms are com[r]

from /b/ to /p/and /g/ to /k/.If we are willing to look at such large-scale, systematic historical connectionsbetween domains of meaning, it becomes evident that not all of semantic change isas whimsical and perverse as has often been assumed. True, prediction of anyindividual c[r]

ceptual system, versus the extent to which they are built up through similarityamong repeated varied instances, is not yet settled and remains an area for futureresearch.One of the major goals of Cognitive Grammar is to describe the nature of lan-guage as it[r]

n(1979). Finally,the self-styled cognitive linguists proposed to take seriously the claim that linguisticknowledge is a cognitive phenomenon, which needs to be studied as an integralaspect of human cognition. In practice, this has entailed framing linguistic analysesin terms [r]

spaces’ and the evanescent shifting between them, that belies the alleged sim-plicity of pointing gestures as primitive referential devices.’’ In Haviland (1996), theapproach is generalized to transpositions other than spatial ones, including thoseinvolved in indexical projectio[r]

exploration of ‘‘unobservable’’ mental constructs.Against this background of dogmatically antimentalistic analysis, CognitiveLinguistics embarked on a radically different course, one that placed conceptualmental spaces 353analysis and cognitive principles squarely at the forefro[r]

since cognitive and linguistic reference frames are not the same (see section 3.3).Finally, one must mention the stimulating but preliminary attempts to explain(spatial) meaning in neural terms within the Neural Theory of Language (e.g.,Feldman and Narayanan 2004;[r]

Occurrent reference, alternatives v., 287 –88O’Connor, Mary Kay, 466–68, 715–16Ogawa, Roy H., 1063–64O’Grady, William, 708Okamoto, Yukari, 1032Oliveira, Marco Antonio de, 952Olivier, Donald C., 1030Olson, David R., 1015‘‘One meaning, one form,’’ 399, 641, 997Ong, Walter J., 1015Onomasiologica[r]

arrangement of mental spaces (i.e., dropping the representation of the fourth generic spaceoriginally suggested by Fauconnier) and has been extended to accommodate backgroundknowledge. The subsequent description neglects the aspects of cross-mappings[r]

centrally in Cognitive Linguistics have been applied to individual languages otherthan English, including typologically unrelated ones—see, e.g., Alverson (1994),Emanatian (1995), Goddard (1996), and Yu (1998) on (aspects of) metaphor theory;or Casad and Langacker (1985), Poteet (1987)[r]

corporation so managers are obligated to do what the stockholders want. Further, amanager has no right to give company money to social causes when doing so will reduceshareholder’s profits. Managers can pay higher wages to employees or provide betterproducts for customers, or give money to lo[r]

different verb island constructions (Gentner and Markman 1997). For example, inEnglish the several verb island constructions that children have with the verbs give,tell, show, send, and so forth, all share a ‘transfer’ meaning, and they all appear ina structure: NP þ V þ NP þ NP. Th[r]

motion’’ (Talmy 1996; Takahashi 2001), such as those in (14).(14) a. The scenery rushed past us. (‘‘frame-relative motion’’)b. I looked toward the valley. (‘‘sensory path’’)c. The road goes through the woods. (‘‘coverage path’’)d. The church faces toward the[r]

whereas in the latter patterns, Agonist and Antagonist are engaged in an opposi-tion of forces, in (7) and (8), absence of possible engagement is expressed. This iswhy the processes expressed in these sentences are called ‘‘secondary steady-stateforce-dynamic processes’’:[r]

Nerlich, Clarke, and Todd 1999 for a brief discussion), but these hardly qualify asarticulated taxonomies or classifications in the strict sense.An exhaustive classification of metonymies remains a project for the future,but it is plausible to assume that metonymies are, at least,[r]

I refer to this process generally as ‘understanding others as intentional (or mental)agents (like the self).’7Language use, which is dependent on mutually shared knowledge of conventions,is crucially dependent on recognizing others like oneself. So, certainly with respectto linguistica[r]

nnemeyer (1991b), and Hopper and Traugott (1993), propose ‘‘that a metaphor ispredominantly a product where meaning change as opposed to individual, oftencreative innovations, is concerned. By contrast, metonymy, being associative andpragmatically involving context-induced inferencing, is an ongoing[r]

information presented in her prior turn (e.g., he was a buyer for the only horse hairfactory left in England), but refers to the whole theme of the conversation up to thatpoint (e.g., that the vicar’s warden was still working at age seventy-nine when hedied). Leslie’s des[r]

The notion of ‘‘conceptual distance’’ provides a natural way to account for avariety of meanings normally associated with the antipassive construction. Ex-ample (23b) is the prototypical case of an antipassive whose object is not as affectedas the dir[r]